

Marshall's Early Philosophical Notebook

Tiziano Raffaelli
Università di Pisa

Introduction¹

The notes here reproduced belong to the early period of Marshall's life, when first metaphysics, and a little later mental philosophy - the forerunner of psychology - were his main interests:

My zeal for economics would never have me got out of bed at five o'clock in the morning, to make my own coffee and work for three hours before breakfast and pupils in mathematics: but philosophy did that till I became ill and my right foot swelled to double its normal size. That was in 1867. Soon after, I drifted away from metaphysics towards psychology. [...] I always said till about 1871 that my home was in Mental Science.²

With the minutes of the Grote Club meetings (Raffaelli 1996), these notes can be read as a sort of appendix to the 'Philosophical writings' (Raffaelli 1994). Together these three manuscripts make up the surviving documents preserved in the Marshall Archive that directly attest Marshall's early penchant for philosophy, except for the annotations on his copies of the books he read.³ At some unknown date, the notes were made up into a hard-cover book, which was later dismantled. Mary lent it to Claude Guillebaud in 1938, with the recommendation to return it to the Marshall Library when he had finished with it.

The notes are a collection of separate bundles and do not form a single and coherent whole. Almost all the notes seem to belong to 1867, as can be inferred from the many quotations from reviews (even a daily newspaper) of that year. However, quite strangely, the list of books on p. 25 of the manuscript bears the annotation may/1869.

Philosophy must here be taken in a wide and loose meaning, since, besides many references to philosophical works properly speaking, there are sayings, annotations and quotations on several subjects, mainly psychology, history, and religion, sometimes verging on ghostology, so much so that, looking for the sources of some passages on Google, I have been redirected to many a New Age website. The most difficult task has been to trace the many books and articles which are referred to, explicitly or implicitly; a task which in some cases was unsuccessful.

Only few statements can be attributed to Marshall himself, and we are left with a feeling of doubt on what he thought of the opposing positions he lists. This is particularly true with regard to *a priori* knowledge and self-consciousness, as dealt with by Hamilton, Bain, Mill and Spencer, who are among the most often quoted authors. These authors' works, as well as those by Ferrier, Grote, Maudsley, Sidgwick, Mansel and others, which also figure in the notes, were all written in the 1850s and 1860s. Marshall looks at them with the eyes of a young curious apprentice philosopher, struggling with the updated version of basic philosophical controversies, without neglecting the old masters, as proved by quotations from Kant, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hamilton's edition of Dugald Stewart. The scenario is typically insular, as the many references to Buckle's *History of Civilization in England* confirm. Foreign authors are usually quoted second-hand, mainly from Hamilton. A notable exception is Kant, whose prominent position in Marshall's philosophical studies is confirmed by his later reminiscences, as quoted by Keynes: 'Kant my guide, the only man I ever worshipped' (Pigou 1925 pp. 10-11).⁴ References to Bastiat, Descartes, Cicero and Condillac seem to be taken from works in the original language. If we add two translated quotations from Machiavelli, the list of non-British primary sources is complete. No trace yet of Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, whose later influence has been documented by Cook (2005, 2008).

Though the whole of the manuscript, by itself, does not add very much to the picture, the fact itself that it was preserved among Marshall's writings shows that it was of some value, maybe only affective. No single connecting thread runs through the notes, and, given their lack of unity, I

thought it is sufficient, when useful, to point out some connections with the ‘Philosophical writings’ and to make a few comments in the footnotes. In the edition of the ‘Philosophical writings’, I made ample reference to these notes and transcribed ‘Man and beast’ in footnote 33 of the introduction, and the note titled ‘Poetry’ in the appendix. The law of parcimony - the title of the first philosophical paper - is mentioned on p. 4 and 6 of the manuscript; Ferrier’s dualistic philosophy is referred to in *Miscellaneous quotations*; traces of ‘Ye machine’ can be detected in various passages. In previous writings I have advanced an interpretation of Marshall’s philosophical journey from Ferrier towards a mix of evolutionary and Hegelian monism, to which I still adhere, but its beginnings are not to be found in these notes. Their main interest lies in helping to form an idea of the range of studies the young Marshall cultivated, and of how seriously he approached relevant philosophical issues of his time.

¹. I wish to thank Simon Cook, Carlo Cristiano and Tiziana Foresti for their help in bringing this work to an end.

². Marshall to Ward 23.9.1900, in Whitaker 1996, vol. 2.

³. Lists of Marshall’s own philosophical books that can be consulted in Cambridge libraries are given in the appendix. Not surprisingly, Marshall’s disliked the excessively polemical attitude of the books he read. For instance, he defended Hamilton against Mill’s criticism (notes on *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy*) and on the other side he rebuked Grote for his attack on Utilitarianism (notes on *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*). He thought that in both cases, a more sympathetic reading of the authors under examination would have made it unnecessary to polemicize.

⁴. Cf. also Scott (1924, pp. 448-49) and the note titled ‘Poetry’, below.

Bibliography

Cook, S. (2005) (ed.) ‘Marshall’s Essay on the history of civilization’, *Marshall Studies Bulletin* 9. Online at: <http://www.dse.unifi.it/CMpro-v-p-137.html>.

Cook, S. (2008) (ed.) ‘Marshall’s early historical notes’, *Marshall Studies Bulletin* 10. Online at: <http://www.dse.unifi.it/CMpro-v-p-139.html>.

Pigou, A.C. (1925) (ed.) *Memorials of Alfred Marshall*, London: Macmillan.

Raffaelli T. (1994) (ed.) ‘The early philosophical writings of Alfred Marshall’, *Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology. Archival Supplement* 4, pp. 51-159.

Raffaelli, T. (1996) (ed.) ‘Notes taken by Marshall During Discussions at the Grote Club Meetings, February-November 1867’, *Marshall Studies Bulletin*, 6 (1996), p. 49-64. Online at <http://www.dse.unifi.it/CMpro-v-p-134.html>

Scott W.R. (1924) ‘Alfred Marshall. 1842-1924’, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 11, pp. 446-57.

Whitaker J.K. (1996) (ed.) *The Correspondence of Alfred Marshall Economist*, 3 volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Text

Meditanda [1-16]¹

[1-2]

The abstract of [all] sequences is Time

The abstract of [all] coexistences is Space.²

A belief which is proved by the inconceivability of its negation to invariably exist is true. Mill's criticism thereon. Why not go straight to experience. What is the use of inconceivability.³

Reality is persistence in consciousness.⁴ NB this is another form of the Universal Postulate.⁵

In 'unconscious mental modifications' - or in actions which we remember to have performed while at the time unconscious of them - how about self-consciousness?⁶

¹. Numbers in square brackets indicate the page number of the manuscript, subdivided into sections, with the titles given in bold letters. Individual page numbers are also given when it seemed to be useful.

Some of the books here referred to are in the Marshall Library Archive, some others were given by Marshall to the Philosophy Library. In the University Library there are two lists of Marshall's books that include philosophical books. They were probably transferred to UL from the Marshall Library. Simon Cook kindly provided me with these three lists. A two-page document in Marshall's own handwriting lists the books he gave to the Moral Science Board in October 1905. They are now in the Philosophy Library. The lists are given in the appendix.

². Spencer H., *First Principles*, London, Williams and Norgate, 1867, pp. 163-4; see Raffaelli, T. (ed.) 'Alfred Marshall's early philosophical writings', *Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology*, Archival Supplement 4, p. 74-75. Marshall's annotated copy of the book is in the Marshall Library.

³. The passage refers to the different views of Mill and Spencer (the latter in agreement on this with Hamilton and other idealist philosophers) on the possibility of *a priori* knowledge (see below, note 5).

⁴. 'By reality we mean persistence in consciousness'; Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 160. Reality of the external world is an instance of necessary truth 'proved by the inconceivability of its negation' (see note below).

⁵. Spencer's Universal Postulate states that 'a belief which is proved by the inconceivability of its negation to invariably exist, is true'. 'The Universal Postulate' is the title of an article published by Spencer in 1853 in the *Westminster Review* (vol. LX, pp. 513-50) and taken up again in the 1st edition of *Principles of Psychology* (1855). Mill replied in the 4th edition of *System of Logic* (1856), denying any exception to the experience hypothesis. (Some of the relevant passages are annotated in Marshall's own copy of this edition. Marshall also owned the 6th and the 7th editions, the latter heavily annotated. All three are in the Cambridge University Library). Neither of the two wanted to emphasize the contrast, as Spencer recognized the provisional nature of the truths derived from his principle (what is inconceivable today, may become conceivable tomorrow), unlike the intuitionist philosophers, such as Whewell and Hamilton, who were Mill's target. However, the controversy went on till the 7th edition of Mill's *System of Logic* (1868) and the 2nd edition of Spencer's *Principles of Psychology* (1872).

~~Method by which having observed a sequence we argue~~

ye different degrees of certainty with which from a single instance a law can be argued.

Contrivances in connexion with instinct. eg by Bees in anomalous hive. How far connected with the fact that contrivance of one kind may be due to fortuitous associations.⁷

[3]

*D. Stewart*⁸

VII, pp. 284-5

a generally and tending to approximate to Utilitarianism⁹

p. 355: Hobbes calls it a habit; but his doing so is a necessary portion of the form of his doctrine: in fact this is one of the many instances of the Utilitarian “obliquities” of D. Stewart.¹⁰

[4]

Law of Parsimony applied. Bain S&E 637. My plan has been to exhibit what seemed to me the genesis of the notion (of Space and Time); and if that is satisfactory to the reader, an *à priori* origin is disproved by being superseded.¹¹

⁶. Cf. Hamilton W., *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, Edinburgh, 1860-62, Lecture XVIII: ‘Consciousness, - general phenomena, - is the mind ever unconsciously modified?’ (*Lectures*, I, pp. 338-363); and Mill’s reply in chapter XV – ‘The doctrine of unconscious mental modifications’ - of *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy* (London: Longman & Co., 1865). Cfr. Raffaelli 1994, p. 69 and n. 69.

⁷. The idea that instincts are contrivances generated by fortuitous experience takes centre stage in ‘Ye Machine’. See Raffaelli 1994, p. 70 and n. 72.

⁸. The following references are to Dugald Stewart, *The Active and Moral Powers of the Mind*, in *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart*, ed. by W. Hamilton, Edinburgh, Thomas and Constable and Co., 1855, vol. VI-VII. Marshall’s 1828 edition is in the Casimir Lewy Library (formerly in the Moral Sciences Library).

⁹. Stewart (vol. VII pp. 284-85) quotes a long passage from Cudworth’s *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* in which Epicurus’s and Democritus’s anticipations of the utilitarian system are discussed.

¹⁰. *ibid.*, p. 355. Stewart starts from Aristotle’s definition of virtues as ‘practical habits, voluntary in their origin’. This is said to be similar to Hobbes’s definition (*De corpore politico*, Part I, chap. 4, § 14), which, though ‘faulty in so far as it involves the author’s selfish theory of morals’, is considered to be ‘nearer to the truth than the greater part of the definitions of virtue to be found in the writings of the moderns’. Sentences like this prompt Marshall’s remark on ‘the Utilitarian “obliquities” of D. Stewart’.

¹¹. Bain A., *The Senses and the Intellect*, 2nd ed., London, Longman & Co., 1864, p. 637. S&E, instead of S&I, is Marshall’s way of referring to the book. The text in round brackets is struck out and replaced by the following reference: ‘Mill on H. 345’. From other quotations, we can infer that Marshall refers to the 1865 edition of Mill’s *Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy* and that the page referred to is p. 245, where Mill

Conf. ib. p. 638 and Bailey, Letters on the Mind Series I p. 72¹²

Anticipatio naturae. Bacon

See generally Buckle on Reid¹³

Locke II, p. 150¹⁴ etc.

Lewes H[istory] of Ph[ilosophy] p. 76 Nil posse creari e nihilo¹⁵

Ham[ilton] Lect.[ures] I 51 155 170¹⁶

The conditions of consciousness Lect XI¹⁷

p 217 no use for Memory¹⁸

Mill on H[amilton] 197¹⁹

endorses Bain's position as it is stated in the sentence transcribed by Marshall: 'Mr Bain's doctrine being as consistent with the admitted facts of the case as Sir W. Hamilton's, has a good claim, on his own Law of Parsimony to be preferred to it' (Mill J. S., *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, London, Longman & Co., 1865, p. 245). Marshall owned both the 1865 (2 copies) and the 1867 editions. The copy of the 1865 edition now in the Marshall Library is heavily annotated. See Raffaelli 1994, p. 62, 75 and note 99.

¹². Bailey S., *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, First Series, London, Longman & Co., 1855. Bailey quotes from Stewart (vol. I, ch. III) who distinguishes imagination from conception because the first is the 'power of modifying our conceptions by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own creation' (p. 72).

¹³. Henry Thomas Buckle's *History of Civilization in England* (2 volumes, London, Parker, Son and Bourne, 1857-61) deals with Reid in the chapter on the Scottish intellect during the eighteenth century (vol. II, pp. 474-86), and his conclusion is that Reid's philosophy 'comes under the head of what Bacon stigmatized as the *anticipatio naturae*, and which he deemed the great enemy of knowledge' (p. 485). Marshall owned the Longman 1867 edition of the book in 3 volumes, and his book is now in the Marshall library, but quotations of pages scattered through the manuscript certainly come from the earlier edition.

¹⁴. J. Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, book III ('Of words'), chapter ii ('The signification of words'), § 2, in vol. II of *Works*, 10th ed., 10 volumes, London, J. Johnson & Co., 1801. Marshall's own copy is now in the Casimir Lewy Library (formerly in the Moral Sciences Library).

¹⁵. Lewes refers to Lucretius's expression, translated into English – Nothing can proceed from nothing – when he explains Anaxagoras's theory of *homoemeriae* (Lewes, G.H. *The History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte*, 3rd edition, 2 volumes, London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1867, vol. I, p. 77. Marshall's own copy of the book is in the Casimir Lewy Library (formerly in the Moral Sciences Library).

¹⁶. The passages referred to are taken from vol. I of W. Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic* (ed. by H.L. Mansel and J. Veitch, 4 volumes, Edinburgh, Blackwood & Sons, 1860-62) and contain general and introductory philosophical remarks: p. 51, various different definitions of philosophy in antiquity; p. 155, philosophical mistakes concerning the relation between substance and phenomenon; p. 170, conditions of permissible hypotheses (a. existence of the phenomenon to be explained, b. impossibility of explaining the phenomena otherwise than by a hypothesis).

¹⁷. Hamilton, *Lectures*, Lecture XI: 'Outline of distribution of mental phenomena - consciousness - its special conditions' (*Lectures*, I, pp. 182-205).

¹⁸. The expression 'no use for memory' is in a long quotation from Reid's criticism of Locke, who takes memory to be consciousness whereas, according to Reid, when there is consciousness there is 'no use for memory' (Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 217).

[5]

Fundamental tendencies of the human mind

To connect causes with effects | Ham[ilton] Lect[ures] on M[etaphysics] I, 66
where see numerous references
to carry up our knowledge into unity²⁰

Wonder Ham[ilton] L[ectures] I 77²¹

To assimilate in opinions and habits of thought to those with whom we live and act
H[amilton] L[ectures] I 84²²

'It is only by a law of thought which compels us to think something, absolute and unknown as
the basis or condition of the relative and known, that this something obtains a kind of
incomprehensible reality to us[']²³

[6]

Bain S[enses]&I[n]tellect Parc[imony]

84) In the proper place I hope to be able to show that without this spontaneity of our actions
the growth of volition or of activities guided to ends is all but inexplicable²⁴

116. Consciousness of mental energy distinguished from muscular energy.²⁵

¹⁹. Mill invokes the law of parcimony to maintain that if we can avoid introducing a new original principle of human nature, and can explain the phenomena through known causes, we are obliged to do so (Mill, *Examination*, 2nd ed., p. 197).

²⁰. 'Of the former class, - that is, of the essential causes [of philosophy], - there are in all two: the one is, the necessity we feel to connect Causes with Effects; the other, to carry up our knowledge into unity' (Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 66).

²¹. 'Besides these intellectual necessities [of refunding effects into their causes ... and of carrying up our knowledge into unity or system] ... there is another powerful subsidiary to the same effect, - in a certain affection of our capacities of feeling. This feeling, according to circumstances, is denominated *surprise*, *astonishment*, *admiration*, *wonder*; and when blended with the intellectual tendencies we have considered, it obtains the name of *curiosity*' (Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 77).

²². 'The existence of society, from a family to a state, supposes a certain harmony of sentiment among its members; and nature has, accordingly, wisely implanted in us a tendency to assimilate in opinions and habits of thought to those with whom we live and act' (Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 84)

²³. Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 137.

²⁴. Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 84.

344 ‘Where should a past feeling be reembodyed if not in the same organ as the feeling when present?’²⁶

[7]

It may be said, and there not wanting those who appear very much disposed to say, if not totidem verbis, at least by strong implication that the conception of *Force* itself as part and parcel of the material system of the Universe is superfluous and therefore illogical.

John Herschel On Origin of Force²⁷

[8]

Mathematical axioms

Space enclosed by st[raight] lines

Mansel Prole.[gomena] 100 Q[quoted]d in M[ill] on H[amilton] 268²⁸

[9]

*Man and Beast*²⁹

Cessation of ideas leads man to seek the both consequences and causes of events, brutes only to seek ~~caus~~ consequences³⁰.

Hobbes, Lev[iathan] ch. III

yet Brutes have prudence, ib[idem]³¹

see also p. 11.

²⁵. Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 116.

²⁶. Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 344: The passage is referred to in *The Law of Parsimony* (Raffaelli 1994, p. 99 and note 16).

²⁷. Herschel J.F.W., ‘On the origin of force’, *Fortnightly Review* 1865, vol I, 435-42, reprinted in *Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, London, Alexander Strahan and Company 1868.

²⁸. Mill, *Examination*, p. 268: Mill quotes Mansel on the radical difference between the conception of a centaur and that of a space enclosed by two straight lines. We have no difficulty in imagining the former, while the latter is inconceivable. Mill’s explanation is that the centaur, unlike the space enclosed by straight lines, is a combination of experiences which can be imagined by association.

²⁹. See Raffaelli, 1994, p. 63. ‘Man and Beast’ is reproduced in footnote 34.

³⁰. Hobbes (*Leviathan*, London, A. Crooke, 1651) maintains that to seek the causes from ‘an effect imagined’ ‘is common to man and beast’, while to ‘seek all the possible effects’ of an imagined thing is a ‘train of thought’ ‘of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only’. Marshall’s annotated copy of the 1st edition of *Leviathan* is now in the Cambridge University Library.

³¹. ‘It is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast’.

B[rutes] cannot reason by languages ib[idem], p. 20³²

B[rutes] can deliberate and will p. 28³³

Distinguished by desire of knowledge p. 26³⁴

and by admiration of novelty p. 26³⁵

N. B. He [Hobbes] seems right in seeing that the pleasure is peculiar [to man]; the sense of novelty *not*.

(N. B. See Fleming on Laughter³⁶)

(N. B. For Self-consciousness see Ferrier: *Institutes*, p. 271-2)³⁷

B[rutes] Have Memory but no art of induction: no experience; Aristotle, quoted by Lewes³⁸

(See Descartes *Med[itationes]*, II (p. 33)³⁹

Expectation as opposed to objective *a priori* necessity allowed them, Kant
Pr.[aktischen]Vern.[unft]Vorr.[ede] 116⁴⁰

[10]

Unthinkable

Hobbes *Leviathan* p. 11. 19.20⁴¹

³². 'If speech be peculiar to man, as for ought I know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also'. The passage is on p. 17, not 20.

³³. 'Beasts, that have *deliberation*, must also have *will*'.

³⁴. 'Desire to know why, and how, CURIOSITY ... is in no living creature but *man*'.

³⁵. 'Admiration' [that is: 'joy, from apprehension of novelty'] is 'proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause'.

³⁶. Fleming W., *The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral and Metaphysical*, London, Richard Griffin & Co., 1857: laughter 'has been thought peculiar to man, as that which distinguishes him from the inferior animals' (p. 283).

³⁷. Ferrier J. F., *Institutes of Metaphysic; The Theory of Knowing and Being*, 2nd ed., Edinburgh and London, W. Blackwood & Sons 1856, pp. 271-72: 'If the inferior animals have no cognisance of themselves - and there is good reason to believe they have none, although no opinion is here offered on this point -, in that case, with all their senses, they are mere incarnate absurdities, gazing upon unredeemed contradiction' (see below).

³⁸. 'The distinction between Brutes and Men is that the former, although they have Memory, have no Experience; that is to say, have not the art which converts Memory into Experience - the art of Induction'. Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, p. 292. The passage is followed by a quotation from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

³⁹. Descartes R., *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*: 'Quid fuit in prima perceptione distinctum? Quid quod non a quovis animali haberi posse videretur? At vero ... non possum sine humana mente percipere'.

⁴⁰. 'We must not say of something which often or always follows a certain antecedent state, that we can conclude from this to that (for this would imply objective necessity and the notion of an *à priori* connexion), but only that we may expect similar cases (just as animals do), that is, that we reject the notion of cause altogether as false and a mere delusion', Kant I., *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*, Leipzig, Modes und Baumann 1838, p. 107-08. Preface (Vorrede) to Part II ('Critical examination of practical reason'). It was not possible to trace the edition from which the quotation is taken.

⁴¹. 'The name of God is used, not to make us conceive him (for he is incomprehensible; and his greatness and power are unconceivable)' (*Leviathan*, p. 11). 'Words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound are those we

Conf the addition drum ib. p. 18⁴²

[11]

No title

Self-consciousness. Bain S[enses]&I[ntellect]

449 = power of introspection

= Locke's Reflection.⁴³

The Self, the I, is recognized in every act of intelligence as the subject to which that act belongs. Ham Lect I 166⁴⁴

See also 193. 203⁴⁵

[12]

Sir W. H.s Lect on M

[13]

Essays on Reform

call *Absurd*, *Insignificant* and *Non-sense*. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a *round Quadrangle*; or *accidents of Bread in Cheese*; or *Immaterial Substances*; or of *A free Subject*; *A free-Will*; or any *Free*, but free from being hindered in opposition, I should not say he were in an Error, but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, *Absurd*. [...] But this privilege [the privilege to enquire into the consequences of anything he conceives and 'by words to reduce the consequences he finds to general Rules, called Theorems, or Aphorismes'], is allayed by another; and that is the privilege of *Absurdity*; to which no living creature is subject, but man only' (*Leviathan* 19-20).

⁴². 'When a man *reasoneth*, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from *addition* of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from *subtraction* of one sum from another'.

⁴³. This is the relevant passage in *Ferrier's Proposition One* (Raffaelli 1994, p. 108): 'Bain's definition of self-consciousness is eminently characteristic. "The taking cognizance," he says, "of the facts of our own mind as phenomena to be known and studied is one of the meanings of the name *consciousness*. A better designation is *self-consciousness* or the power of introspection" [Bain, *The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 449]. And in order to make his meaning yet clearer he says: "Locke applies the term Reflection to this operation". ... yet as Bain has introduced the illustration it will be as well to quote Locke's exact words: he defines it as "the perception of the operations of our own mind within us as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider them, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without" [Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, book II, chapter I, paragraph 4, in *Works*, 1801, vol. I, p. 78]'.

⁴⁴. 'The Self, the I, is recognised in every act of intelligence, as the subject to which that act belongs ... In English *the I* could not be tolerated ... The term *Self* is more allowable' (Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, pp. 166-67). The passage is quoted in *Ferrier's proposition One* (Raffaelli 1994, p. 107)

⁴⁵. 'Though the simplest act of mind, consciousness thus expresses a relation subsisting between two terms. These terms are, on the one hand, an I or Self, as the subject of a certain modification, - and, on the other, some modification, state, quality, affection, or operation belonging to the subject' (Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 193).

5. If any ~~measure~~ dictate of political justice *were* sanctioned by the reason and conscience of mankind it would of course be *ipso facto* beneficial. But any thing like household suffrage would be opposed to some of the principles laid down of p. 15. In fact I do not see that there are any maxims of political justice which are approved (I do not say always by every one) but always and under all circumstances by any one.

20

[14]

Ye laws of nature

15⁴⁷

“Let it be left to practical experimentalists still to supply their rough approximations and to mathematicians to ~~accumulate the theoretical evidence which a long elaborated calculation will enable them to derive from imag~~ seek for the in the imaginary experiments which every are involved in almost every step of an elaborate analysis for tests far more ~~accurate~~ subtle than we can conceive to be given by any of their methods, ~~far~~ tests almost indefinitely subtle but never absolutely exact[”].

[15]

“Had this opinion been only advocated by members of the despised race of metaphysicians I should have had more hesitation in engaging in a task which would have been by so many people contemptuously compared to that of laboriously cudgelling a shadow”.

[16]

Faculties of the Human Mind

Sense of self-consciousness H[amilton Lect.[ure] I⁴⁸

⁴⁶. Brodrick G.C., ‘The Utilitarian argument against reform, as stated by Mr. Lowe’, in *Essays on Reform*, London, Macmillan, 1867. The passage has not been traced. A related passage is on p. 5 of Brodrick’s book: ‘Real facts are more trustworthy than the dictates of political justice: but the dictates of political justice, so far as they are warranted by our knowledge of human nature, and sanctioned by the reason and conscience of mankind, are more trustworthy than hypothetical facts’.

⁴⁷. This and the following quotation have not been traced.

*T.W.*⁴⁹ [17-20]

In performing many actions and in taking part in many conversations an irresistible (but generally erroneous) conviction arises that the same scene has been passed through before under the same circumstances; and the same words having been frequently used on both occasions.

Hudson⁵⁰ has not only remarked this himself, but says that every one to whom he has talked on the subject has done the same.

Question. Is this experience very common, and how far is the 'conviction' 'erroneous'?

See Misc Quot.ns p. 1⁵¹

Our diarists could only tell us how many *yards* long the comets seemed to be.

Chambers Annals of Scotland⁵²

* My hand had been supporting my chin. I put it to my forehead and had the sensation of intense warmth. My first impression was that my forehead was warm. But I speedily perceived that it was my hand which was strikingly hot. I however did not feel comfortable till I had verified this by putting my hand to my chin and again to my forehead.

* to be accounted for by the fact that when I put my hand in that position to ascertain any thing about warmth it is generally my forehead that is the subject of observation

⁴⁸. Hamilton, *Lectures*, Lecture I, pp. 1-18: 'Philosophy - Its absolute utility. (a) subjective'.

⁴⁹. This most probably stands for Terse Writings.

⁵⁰. Hudson William Henry H. (1838-1915), St John's, admitted 1857, 3rd wrangler 1861, Fellow 1862; Mathematical Lecturer, St Catherine's College, Cambridge, 1862-1863, 1867-1868 and St John's College, Cambridge, 1869-1881; Professor of Mathematics, King's College, London, 1882-1903 and Queen's College, London, 1883-1905.

⁵¹. See below note 129.

⁵². Chambers R., *Domestic Annals of Scotland, from the Reformation to the Revolution*, 2 volumes, Edinburgh, W. & R. Chambers, 1858. The quotation is probably taken from Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, (vol. II, note 2, pp. 413-4).

Bonney⁵³ looked at a man whose head was turned completely away from him. He turned round, and in explanation said that he could always *feel* when another was looking at him. Even this is not conclusive testimony that the ‘feeling’ operates when the eyes of the looker are *behind* those of the looked. This particular case might have been accidental

Do watchmakers acquire a habit of soft breathing so as not to disturb the steadiness of their fingers: particularly in cases in which many generations have been watchmakers?⁵⁴

Water was flowing steadily out of a pipe (that connecting ye Johnian and Trinity ditches). Two boys age about 40 12 were looking at it. One of them remarked: ‘I should think a bucketful came out *each time*’. The other assented

When putting away books and before going to bed my eye fell on my watch lying on the table. The thought passed through my mind that I must take it into my room with me. I then closed a book with my left hand (my pocket kerchief was in my right) carefully putting a mark in it and thinking about using it next morning. Thus the idea of the watch was not present to my consciousness at all. When I turned from the book my attention was roused by the fact that my waistcoat watch pocket would contain no more of my kerchief. I had rammed half in.

NB I was not sleepy.

Memoranda for Fleming [21-34]⁵⁵

[21]

Mill - Volition D. St. VI 344⁵⁶

Conf App[endix] to Bain and quotations from H.[erbert] S.[pencer]⁵⁷

⁵³. Bonney Thomas G. (1833-1923), St John’s, 12th wrangler 1856, Fellow, College Tutor 1868-1876; Professor of Geology, University College, London, 1876-1901; President of the Geological Society, 1884-1886.

⁵⁴. See Raffaelli 1994, p. 74 and n. 89.

⁵⁵. Fleming W., *The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral and Metaphysical*, London and Glasgow, R. Griffin & Co., 1857.

⁵⁶. What D. St. stands for is not clear to me.

⁵⁷. Appendix C of Bain’s *The Senses and the Intellect*, ‘The germs and the development of volition’, quotes Spencer’s *Psychology* on the mechanical connection between actions which can explain ‘why certain movements, out of a great number happening, are retained by preference’; that is, become the object of volition.

~~Scepticism and Empiricism~~

~~HS on M on H~~⁵⁸

Mill F[ortnightl]y I 509⁵⁹

~~Excluded Middle Def.n~~

~~H. S. on M~~ 535

~~Inconceivable~~

Association Mansel Met[aphysics] 239⁶⁰

Condillac p 51⁶¹

[22]

Arist[otle]

Util: [itarianism]

Butlers 3

Tugend:[lehre, Kant]

Bentham

Bentham:

Butler:

Ferrier

Fischer⁶²

Bain

Mill Log[ic]

Mans[el] Prole[gomena]

⁵⁸. Spencer H., 'Mill vs. Hamilton – the test of truth', *Fortnightly Review*, I, 1865, pp. 535-50.

⁵⁹. Here Marshall refers to the editor's review of J. S. Mill's *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the Principal Question Discussed in his Writings*, *Fortnightly Review*, 1, p. 509, where the reviewer quotes a long passage by Mill on sensation.

⁶⁰. Mansel H.L., *Metaphysics, or, The Philosophy of Consciousness, Phenomenal and Real*, 2nd ed., Edinburgh, A.&C. Black 1866, p. 239. Mansel here presents Hamilton's two laws of association: Repetition and Redintegration.

⁶¹. On pp. 51-2, Mansel criticizes Condillac's hypothesis of the statue becoming conscious through sensation only.

⁶². Probably Fischer K., *Commentary on Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason*, translated into English in 1866 (London, Longmans & Green).

Mill Pol[itical] Econ[omy]

[23]

1. Pla S om

2 S

3. P&S⁶³ omit

4 P. omit restriction

7 Whole of Stewart S&P

8. System Mor[ality] for P&S

9. Blue Book

Mackintosh dissertation [on the progress of ethical philosophy] P&S

Represent[ative] Gov.[ernment] S

[24]

M[oral] and P[olitical] Philosophy

1 Plato Rep[ublic]

2 Arist[otle] Ethics

3 Cicero De off[iciis]

4 Butler 3 Sermons

5 Kant Einleitung in die Methaphysik der Sitten

6 Kant Tugendlehre

7 Stewart Out[lines] & Moral Powers Bks I II

8 Whewell Elements of morality

9 Bentham Principles of morals & legislation & of Civil Code

Mental Philo[sophy]

Descartes Discourse de la Methode

⁶³ . P and S probably stand for Primary and Secondary, and refer to the reading lists of the two classes of students (I owe this interpretation to Simon Cook).

Locke Essay Bks I II IV

Cousin on Kant

on Locke

Hamilton Lect[ures] on Met[aphysics]

Ferrier Inst[itutes] of Met[aphysic]

Bain S[enses]&I[n]tellect]

[25]

Subjects of [...] ⁶⁴ may/69

Arist[otle] Eth[ics]

Whewell Morality

D. Stewart Act[ive] .& Mor.[al] Pow[ers]

Mill's Logic

Whately Logic

Mansel Prole[egomena] Log[ica]

Mill Pol[itical] Econ[omy]

Bastiat Harm.[onies] Pol.[itiques]⁶⁵

Bain S[enses]&I[n]tellect]

Mansel Psy Met.[aphysics]

Ferr.[ier]

Inst.[itutes] of Met.[aphysic]

[26]

Logic

Mansel Prole.[gomena] Log[ica]

Hamilton Lectures on Log[ic]

Whately Elements of Logic

Thomson Laws of Thought

Bacon Nov[um] Org[anum]

Whewell Nov[um] Org[anon] Renovatum⁶⁶

⁶⁴. Illegible word. It could be 'a sale'.

⁶⁵. It should be Harmonies economiques.

Mill System of Logic

Pol.[itical] Econ[onomy]

Adam Smith The Wealth

Ricardo Princ.[iples] of Pol[itical] Econ[omy] & Taxation

Mill Pol[itical] Econ[omy]

Cairnes Character & Logical Method of Pol.[itical] Econ[omy]

Bastiat Harmonies Economiques

Terse Sayings [27-35]

Frederick the Great lost the battle of Jena

F[ortnightl]y 35 523⁶⁷

There is some one who is more able than Talleyrand, more able than Napoleon *c'est tout le monde*

Ib p. 527⁶⁸

Men [...] ⁶⁹ learned to seek the *how* instead of the *why*

When you know nothing place Terrors.

Helps, speaking of savage nations (Bain E[motions]&W[ill] 62)⁷⁰

The mothers' faith in the child passes every other form of 'credulity'

⁶⁶. Whewell W., *Novum Organon Renovatum*, London, John W. Parker, 1858.

⁶⁷. 'We have all heard the saying that "Frederic the Great lost the battle of Jena." It was the system which he had established - a good system for his wants and his times, — which, blindly adhered to, and continued into a different age, put to strive with new competitors, brought his country to ruin'. Bagehot, W. 'The English Constitution: on changes of ministry', *Fortnightly Review*, 6, n. 35, 1866 pp. 513-37 (p. 523).

⁶⁸. Bagehot W., 'The English Constitution', p. 527.

⁶⁹. Illegible word. It could be 'had'.

⁷⁰. Bain A., *The Emotions and the Will*, 2nd ed., London, 1865, p. 62, where he quotes the saying by Arthur Helps.

Bain E[motions]&W[ill] 79⁷¹

The love of contradiction & a fondness for paradox are modifications of the irascible feeling

Bain E[motions]&W[ill] 141⁷²

Dr Johnson's definition of genius - Large general powers operating in a particular direction.

Conf 'A man can walk as far east as he can west'.

Humanity is the virtue of a woman, generosity of a man

Adam Smith Th[.eory] of M[.oral] S[.entiments] vol. II, 19

Buckle disputes this⁷³

A. Smith lays down as the criterion of right 'The sympathetic feeling of the impartial and well informed spectator'⁷⁴

Sir J. Mackintosh got great credit for saying 'constitution are not made but grown'. In our day the most significant thing about this saying was [is] that it was thought so significant⁷⁵

A small ray of truth has seemed brilliant, as a distant rushlight looks like a star in the surrounding darkness

H[erbert] S[pencer] Essa[ys]. II series 143⁷⁶

Achilles was committed to a centaur

Machiavelli⁷⁷

⁷¹. Bain A., *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 79.

⁷². Bain, A., *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 141.

⁷³. Smith's quotation, from the 1822 London edition, is taken from Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, vol. II, p. 440, note 48.

⁷⁴. Smith A., *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* IV.2.10.

⁷⁵. The quotation is taken from Spencer's essay 'The social organism', *Westminster Review*, January 1860, reprinted in *Essays scientific, political and speculative*, London, Longman & Co., 1858-74. Now available online at <http://www.bolenderinitiatives.com/sociology/herbert-spencer-1820-1903/herbert-spencer-social-organism-1860>.

⁷⁶. Spencer H., 'The social organism', in *Essays scientific, political and speculative*, II series, p. 143.

⁷⁷. Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, cap. 18.

Be a good hypocrite; you will never want dupes. Seem mild, courteous religious sincere. Be so, now and then, if you can⁷⁸

	ὅτι	historical
γνώσις	ἐστὶ	
	διότι	philosophical

Ham[ilton] L[ectures] on M[etaphysics] I 58⁷⁹

There are two essential - causes of philosophy

(i) the necessity we feel to connect causes with effects (ii) to carry up our knowledge into unity

(ii) ib 66⁸⁰

Omnis pulchritudinis forma unitas est

S. Augustin Epist[ulae] XVIII⁸¹

The child is wholly absorbed in the contemplation of the world without. The world within first engages the contemplation of the man. As it is with the individual, so was it with the species

H[amilton] L[ectures on Met[aphysics] I 80⁸²

~~Opinion~~ Imagination disposes all things: it constitutes beauty, justice, happiness: & these are the all in all of the world

Pascal Pensées I VI 3⁸³

⁷⁸. Free rendering from the same chapter.

⁷⁹. ‘And as the Greek language, expresses historical knowledge by the ὅτι - the γνώσις ὅτι ἐστὶ: so well it expresses philosophical knowledge by the διότι - the γνώσις διότι ἐστὶ’ (Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 58)

⁸⁰. Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, 66.

⁸¹. The quotation is taken from an editorial footnote to Hamilton, (*Lectures*, I, p. 69). Hamilton’s editors, H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, add to various ‘testimonies to the love of unity’, St Augustin’s application of the principle of Unity to explain Beauty.

⁸². Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, 80. The original text is ‘absorbed in the observation ...’.

⁸³. The passage from Pascal (*Pensées*, partie I art. vi § 3) is taken from Hamilton (*Lectures*, I, p. 89). The editors, H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, explain that Pascal’s original text had ‘imagination’ and was restored by Faugère.

Every opinion is strong enough to have had its martyrs


Montaigne⁸⁴

O doxa, doxa, quam es communis noxa

Luther⁸⁵

Mr Lincoln answered well Frederick the Great's definition of a Prince - 'the first of subjects'.
His confidence in them was as simple & unhesitating as his loyalty was perfect

Conway in F[ortnightl]y Review⁸⁶



Ham[ilton] L[ectures] on M[etaphysics] I 125⁸⁷

Ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ὠξῶμεν, καὶ αἰσθανομεθα καὶ διανοῦμεθα πρῶτως⁸⁸

The attention of the intellect is a natural prayer by which we obtain the enlightenment of reason

Malebranche, Q[ui]oted by Ham[ilton] L[ectures] I, 260⁸⁹

A board is a screen

⁸⁴. The passage from Montaigne (*Essays*, liv. I, ch. 40) is quoted by Hamilton (*Lectures*, I, p. 89).

⁸⁵. Another quotation taken from Hamilton (*Lectures*, I, p. 89).

⁸⁶. Conway M. D., 'Personal recollections of President Lincoln', *Fortnightly Review*, 1 (May 1865), pp. 56-65.

⁸⁷. The diagram, which is handwritten in the manuscript without modifications, is here taken from Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 125.

⁸⁸. 'The soul is that by which primarily we live, perceive, and think'. Aristotle, *De anima* II.2, from Hamilton, *Lectures*, I p. 139 note gamma.

⁸⁹. Malebranche, *Traité de Morale*, partie I, chap. v, § 4. The passage is quoted by Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 260 to prove the paramount importance of attention.

I may perceive distance by the eye as I may perceive a mail coach in the next street by the sound of the horn

Bain E[motions]&W[ill] 584⁹⁰

To be under the eyes of others - to have to defend oneself to others - is never more important than to those who act in opposition to the opinion of others, for it obliges them to have some ground of their own. Nothing has so steadying an influence as working against pressure

Mill R.[epresentative] G.[overnment] 84⁹¹

'The Prophets were in Church and State the equivalent of the modern liberty of the press'
'just but not adequate

Mill R.[epresentative] G.[overnment] 17⁹²

Every man is strong enough to enforce his conviction

Goethe⁹³

Next to exact knowledge there is nothing so instructive as exact error

Lewes⁹⁴

~~Time is~~ The abstract of all sequences is Time. The abstract of all ~~sequ~~ coexistences is Space⁹⁵

The history of philosophy is to a great extent a history of the fascination exercised by phrases

Lewes Hist[ory] of Phil[osophy] new ed II 439⁹⁶

For motion produceth nothing but motion

Hobbes, Lev[iathan] Ch I⁹⁷

⁹⁰. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 584.

⁹¹. Mill, *Representative Government*, chap. x, p. 84. Marshall owned two copies of the book. The 1872 edition, annotated, is in the Marshall Library, the 1865 edition is in the UL. Both were edited by Longman, Green & Co., London. Page numbers are the same.

⁹². Mill, *Representative Government*, chap. II, p. 17

⁹³. This quotation is probably taken from the article 'Chess', *Atlantic Monthly*, 5 n. 32, June 1860, p. 671. 'Is' is Marshall's addition.

⁹⁴. Lewes *History of Philosophy*, 1867, vol. I, p. 363.

⁹⁵. See above, note 2.

⁹⁶. Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, 1867, vol. II, p. 439.

Madness when its origin is fairly examined always means discord between the individual and his circumstances

Maudsley, Ph[ysiology] & P[athology] of Mind 159⁹⁸

The profound epigram of Agassiz that the world in dealing with a new truth passes through three stages: it first says that is not true; than that it is contrary to religion: and finally that we knew it before

H. Sidgwick in MacMillan for 67 Art[icle] on Arnold⁹⁹

Excerpts from the Talmud

Quarterly for Oct 67¹⁰⁰

‘Scripture ordains that the Hebrew slave who “loves” his bondage shall have his ear pierced against the door post. Why? Because it is that ear wh. Heard on Sinai “They are my servants” ... And the man voluntarily throws away his freedom. “Pierce his ear”. Even when the gates of prayer are shut in heaven, those of tears are open.

When the righteous die it is the earth that loses. The lost jewel will always be a jewel, but the possessor who has lost it – well may he weep.

Even the most righteous shall not attain to so high a place in heaven as the truly repentant.

Iron breaks the stone, fire melts iron, water extinguishes fire, the clouds drink up the water, storm drives away the clouds, man withstands the storm, fear unmans man, wine dispels fear, sleep drives away wine, and death sweeps all away -even sleep. But Solomon the wise says “Charity saveth from death”

Descend a step in choosing a wife, mount a step in choosing a friend.

⁹⁷. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 3

⁹⁸. Maudsley H., *The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, London, 1867, p. 159.

⁹⁹. Sidgwick H., ‘The prophet of culture’ in *Macmillan’s Magazine*, April 1867.

¹⁰⁰. Deutsch E.O.M., ‘The Talmud’, *The Quarterly Review*, 1867, pp. 417-64.

Get your living by skinning carcasses in the street, and do not say I am a priest, I am a great man; this work would not befit my dignity.

Use a noble vase even for one day – let it break tomorrow

Teach thy tongue to say, I do not know

Who is strong? He who subdues his passions. Who is rich? He who is satisfied with his lot.

The writer says Moses saw everything clearly; the other prophets as in dark mirror. He goes on to quote -

‘Ezekiel and Isaiah say the same things, but Ezekiel like a town-bred man, Isaiah like a villager’.

Even for the sake of a babe the Sabbath may be broken for the babe will keep many a Sabbath yet for that one which was broken for it.

The Sabbath, says the writer, was ‘a day of joy and delight’, ‘a feast day’ and he quotes the adage ‘Better live on your Sabbath as you would on a week day than be dependent upon others.

The following also are adages -

Jerusalem was destroyed because the instruction of the young was neglected

The word is only saved by the breath of the school children

Even for the rebuilding of the Temple the schools must not be interrupted.

Study is more meritorious than sacrifice. A scholar is greater than a prophet.

The writer says – In the judgement on Sin the *animus* is taken into consideration. The desire to commit the vice is held to be more wicked than the vice itself.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹. Here is the end of quotations from ‘The Talmud’.

Providence has given to the French the empire of the Land, to the English the Empire of the Sea; and to the Germans the empire of the Air.

Richter Q[ui]oted by Carlyle¹⁰²

But when they stripped him of his ornaments it was the baubles lost their grace, not he

Spanish Gypsy 48¹⁰³

Children are afraid of being left in the dark: men are afraid of *not* being left in it.

Landor¹⁰⁴

Coleridge in lecturing said something of a democratic tendency. His audience expressed disapproval. 'I am not surprised' said he 'that when the red hot prejudices of aristocrats are plunged into the cool element of reason they should go off with a hiss'.

'Appear to have rather less wit than you have. A wise man will live as much within his wit as ~~within~~ his income

Chesterfield¹⁰⁵

Strip M-ajest-y of its externals and it becomes a jest.

Il faut beaucoup de philosophie pour observer ce qu'on voit tous les jours¹⁰⁶

Similes Metaphors & [36-45]

He shook like a pole fixed in the rush of a tide.

¹⁰². T. Carlyle's review of Heinrich Doering 'Jean Paul Friedrich Richter's Life, with a sketch of his work', *Edinburgh Review*, 95, June 1827, p. 180.

¹⁰³. Eliot G., *The Spanish Gypsy*, London and Edinburgh, William Blackwood and sons, Edinburgh and London, 1868, p. 48.

¹⁰⁴. Landor W.S., *Imaginary Conversations*, London, James Duncan 1829, vol. II (V of the series), p. 252.

¹⁰⁵. Lord P.D.S. Chesterfield, *Letters to his son*, 18.12.1765 to his godson.

¹⁰⁶. Rousseau's dictum is probably taken from chapter 1 of Bastiat's *Harmonies Économiques*.

Meredith¹⁰⁷

An earthquake accompanied by thunder and lightning going up express to London.

Mugby junction¹⁰⁸

A Kentuckian wishing some government aid in recovering his slaves ‘reminded’ Lincoln ‘of a little story. When I was going down the Ohio in a steamer a little boy came up to the Captain and said “Captain, please stop the boat a little while; I’ve lost my apple overboard.”

Conway in F[ortnightl]y Review¹⁰⁹

As every additional part of a mechanical apparatus entails a loss of force, so does every syllogism entail a loss of certainty. As no machine can produce an equivalent to the moving power, so no argument can establish a conclusion equally certain with that primary knowledge on which all argument is based.

Spencer Psy[chology] old 61¹¹⁰.

Man’s soul is at first one unvaried blank till it has received the impressions of external experience. Yet has this blank been already touched by a celestial hand, and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its tinge from accident but from design, and comes out covered with a glorious pattern.

Sedgwick Discourse p. 54¹¹¹

The two systems of concentric circles w[hich] the shock given by Bentham and Coleridge [them] is spreading over the ocean of mind[,] have only just begun to meet and intersect.

Mill Dissert[at]ions&Disc[ussions] I 331¹¹².

¹⁰⁷. I was unable to trace this quotation.

¹⁰⁸. Dickens C., *Mugby Junction. The extra Christmas number of All the year round*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1866. The quoted sentence is at the beginning (I.i).

¹⁰⁹. Moncure D. Conway, ‘Personal recollections of President Lincoln’, *Fortnightly Review*, 1, 1865, p. 62.

¹¹⁰. Spencer H., *The Principles of Psychology*, London, Longman & Co., 1855, p. 61. The second edition was published in two volumes, the first of which came out in 1870, though publication by instalments started in 1868. The passage, and the whole of “Similes Metaphors &c” was probably written not earlier than in 1870. Marshall’s annotated copy of the second edition is in the Marshall Library. See Raffaelli 1994, p. 79 and n. 114.

¹¹¹. Sedgwick A., *A Discourse on the Studies of the University*, Cambridge, J.J. Deighton and London, J.W. Parker, 1834, p. 54.

Our philosophy was born about Bacon's time, and Bacon's name (as the brightest who presided at the time of its birth) has been inscribed upon it.

Hesperus that led the starry host rode brightest. Not that Hesperus did actually *lead* the other stars, he and they were moving under a common force, and they would have moved just as fast if he had been away; but because he shone brightest, he looked as if he led them.

Spedding's Bacon I 374.¹¹³

As we see in the water through the wind cease the waves give not over rowling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in this internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams &c.

Hobbes Lev[iathan] ch II¹¹⁴

As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account, nor what it is he pays for; he advantageth himself no more, than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of the accountant's skill and honesty: so also in reasoning of all other things, he that taketh up conclusions on the trust of authors, and does not fetch from the first items in every reasoning, which are the significations of names settled by definitions, loses his labour; and doth not know anything, but only believeth.

H[obbes] ch 5

Corporations, which are as it were many lesser Commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man.

Hobbes Lev[iathan] ch 29

It is with the mysteries of our Religion as with wholesome pills for the Sick, which swallowed whole have the virtue to cure; but chewed are for the most cast up again without effect

¹¹². Mill J.S., 'Bentham', in *Dissertations and Discussions*, 3 volumes, London, Longmans & Co., 1867. The quotation is in vol. I, p. 331.

¹¹³. *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. by J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath, London, Longman and Co., 1857-1874, vol. 1, p. 374.

¹¹⁴. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, pp. 4-5.

The moral and political system of Hobbes was a palace of ice, transparent[,] exactly proportional[,] majestic, admired by the unwary as a delightful dwelling[;] but gradually undermined by the central warmth of human feeling, before it was thawed into muddy water by the sunshine of true philosophy

Mackintosh, Hist[ory of the Revolution in England in 1688] 132¹¹⁵

NB If pure ice thaws into muddy water the dirt must be supplied by the soil on which it rests (in this case “human feeling”)¹¹⁶

Such opinions as are taken [onely] upon credit of antiquity are not intrinsically the judgments of those that cite them but words that pass (like gaping) from mouth to mouth.

Hobbes Leviathan conclusion

It is an argument of indigestion when Greek and Latin sentences unchewed come up again as they use to do unchanged.

Ib

In a large classes of diseases we have obviously a species of insolvency to be dealt with acc[ording] to the sound method of readjusting the relations of expenditure and income. ... Drugs even in their happiest application can but guide and favour the restorative process; just as the stirring of the fire may make it burn provided there be the needful fuel.

Bain in M'millan 1867¹¹⁷

The constitution of man is such that he can only remember that he has been in pain, he cannot remember the pain. The constitution of the world is such that it can only remember that it has been in error: it cannot remember the error, ie reconceive it.

Moreover the causes are similar

¹¹⁵. The page number corresponds to Mackintosh J., *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, A. and C. Black & Co, Edinburgh, 1836.

¹¹⁶. This is an odd and telling vindication of Hobbes, against Mackintosh's dismissive remark.

¹¹⁷. Bain A., 'On the correlation of force in its bearing on mind', *Macmillan's Magazine*, 16, 1867, pp. 372-83. The quoted passage is on p. 380.

a m¹¹⁸

Metaphysical ghosts cannot be killed because they cannot be touched; but they may be dispelled by dispelling the twilight in which shadows and solidities are easily confounded.

Lewes Hist of Phil I lxxxiv¹¹⁹

It is with justice that the substance of Spinoza has been compared to the den of the lion wh.[ere] there are many steps to, but few from.

Schwegler p. 175¹²⁰

In the good glacier down with which we are slowly moving there broke out some time ago a certain chasm, and an intelligent man of those times, one Dr Paley, built a bridge over the same. The support for the further end of this bridge still remains: but further on there has broken out a greater chasm than the former. But its existence is mostly unknown. Those cautious Souls who go slowly across rest on the thin hedge on the other side. They mostly squat across it and so don't fall: and they think they have done all. If one will go with headlong pace expecting the bridge to conduct him to a firm footing he mostly goes headlong down into the great chasm on the other side.

a m¹²¹

“Give your decisions boldly” said a celebrated lawyer to a layman who had been appointed governor of a colony “they will be mostly right. But never give your reasons: they will be always wrong.”¹²²

So with regard to popular beliefs of all kinds. It is true that the real affections of the brain which gave rise to a belief in ghosts do mostly occur after midnight. There is every reason for believing that real results could be obtained from psalmistry. And looking forward we may with confidence [believe] that whatever be its rationale, in the concrete Homoeopathy cannot be wholly false. So with regard to Phrenology.

¹¹⁸. This and other similes and sentences, signed a m, are probably due to Marshall himself.

¹¹⁹. Lewes G., *History of Philosophy*, 2nd ed., 1867, p. lxxxiv.

¹²⁰. Schwegler A., *Handbook of the History of Philosophy*, Edinburgh, Edmonston & Douglas, 1867.

¹²¹. See above note 118.

¹²². The story, referring to Lord Mansfield, is narrated by Mill, *System of Logic*, book II, ch. 3, § 3. Mill owned the 4th 6th and 7th editions of this book.

“Philosophy is the servant of Theology” said some one. “Yes” said Kant “but the question is whether she is the torch bearer or the train bearer”¹²³

Ein alter Priester zu Memphis hatte in der Borhalle seiner Wohnung das Bild der verschleierten Isis stehen. Es War sehr funstreich aus grauem Marmor gebildet. Sein Sohn, ein lebhafter, rühriger Knabe, stand oft vor dem Bilde, und ihn lüstete sehr, das verborgene Antlitz der Gottinn zu schauen. Eines Tages, mochte er seine Neugier nicht langer bezahmen; er nahm Hammer und Meißel, und schlug mit einigen Streichen den Schleier ab. Allein zu seinem grossen Erslaunen erblickte erß jetzt nichts weiter als ein Stuck des rohen, formlosen Steines. – “Was machst du da?” fragte der Priester, der eben dazu kam. – “Ich wollte das Gesicht der Gottinn sehen.” – “Ach,” feufzte jener “dir ist begegnet, was mir geschah, als ich ein Jungling war und die Wahrheit in den Schulen der Gelehrten zu finden meint.”

Q[ote]d in Lebahn’s Faust p. 422¹²⁴

The intense, lifefull, lifegiving, all producing energy of “Sinn” may have suggested the name “Sonne”. The derived, changing, subtle and chastened influence of the “Mund” may have suggested that of the “Maid”

a m¹²⁵

Each character assimilates from surrounding circumstances that by which it is [which is by it] assimilable, rejecting the rest just as from earth and air the plant draws those elements which will serve it as food rejecting the rest

Lewes Life of Goethe ch. III¹²⁶

That poor circumstance
Called human life, - customs and bonds and laws
Wherewith men make a better or a worse,
Like children playing on a barren mound

¹²³. This is a loose quotation from Kant, ‘The Conflict of the Faculties’, in *Perpetual Peace*, London, 1796, p. 39. See Raffaelli (1994, p. 61)

¹²⁴. Goethe J.W. Von, *Faust*, with notes by K.F. Lebahn, London, Longman, 1853.

¹²⁵. See above note 118.

¹²⁶. Lewes G.H., *The Life and Work of Goethe*, London, Smith and Elder, 1864; book I, chapter III.

Feigning a thing to strive for or avoid

ye Spanish Gypsy p. 291¹²⁷

(In answer to a man interspersing many “said”s in his account)

“O do without the ‘said’
Open thy mouth and pause in lieu of it.
I had as lief be pelted with a pea
Irregularly in the selfsame spot
As

Ib., p. 33

... I shall be no more missed
Than waves are missed that leaping on the rock
Find there a bed and rest. Life’s a vast sea
That does its mighty errand without fail,
Panting in unchanged strength though waves are
changing

p. 279

The great avenging Angel does not crawl
To kill the serpent with a mimic fang
He stands erect, with sword of keenest edge
That kills [slays] like lightning

p. 310

I have obeyed your word, have followed it
As water does the furrow in the rock

p. 311

¹²⁷. Eliot G., *The Spanish Gypsy*, p. 291.

With the injustices of men as with the convulsions and disasters of nature, the longer they remain unrepaired, the greater become the obstacles to repairing them arising from the aftergrowths which would have to be torn up or broken through.¹²⁸

Miscellaneous Quotations [46-73]¹²⁹

T.W.¹³⁰

Dugald Stewart is ‘inclined to believe that Adam Smith possessed a power not perhaps uncommon among absent men of recollecting in consequence of subsequent efforts of reflection many occurrences which at the time at which [when] they happened did not seem to have sensibly attracted his notice.’

Life of Adam Smith in Edition by McCulloch p. XIX¹³¹

Stewart says ‘Smith considered every species of note as a blemish or imperfection, indicating either an idle accumulation of superfluous particulars, or a want of skill and comprehension in the general design.’

Ib p. XVII¹³²

There is an icelander’s legend that a gnome was ordered to build a snow-man on ground on which a hot spring was bubbling up. Even just as he was about to complete the head and shoulders the whole mass fell to the ground. The Daily Telegraph (Jan 14.67) compares his fate to that of the Emperor of Austria¹³³

A person complained to Gotthold that he had met with ingratitude. But Gotthold: ‘Did you ever see horses taken to water? They rush into some beautiful [stream] drink of it to their

¹²⁸. Mill J.S., *Principles of Political Economy*, People’s edition, London, Longmans & Co., 1865; book 2, chap. ii, § 2. Marshall’s copy of the book is in the Cambridge University Library.

¹²⁹. This annotation seems to match the reference to ‘Miscellaneous Quotations p. 1’ (see above note 51).

¹³⁰. See above note 49.

¹³¹. McCulloch J.R., ‘Sketch of the life and writings of Adam Smith’, in Smith A., *The Wealth of Nations*, ed. by J.R. McCulloch, 4 volumes, Edinburgh, A. and C. Black, 1828; new ed. 1863, p. xix.

¹³². *ibid.*, p. xvii.

¹³³. *The Daily Telegraph*, 14.1.1867, p. 4.

heart's content, then turn their backs upon it or trample it with their feet until the water is thick and muddy. But the noble river floats away the mud and continues after as it was before, full and free of access for the same or other thirsty creatures.

Sunday Reader I¹³⁴

Mr Bright and his school of Democrats thinks themselves greatly concerned in ~~thinking~~ maintaining that the franchise is what they term a right, not a trust. Now this one idea[,] taking root in the general mind[,] does a moral mischief far outweighing all the good that the ballot could do[,] at the highest possible estimate of it.

Mill R.[representative] G.[overnment] 80¹³⁵

The one indispensable merit of a government in favour of which it may be forgiven almost any other amount of demerit compatible with progress is that its operation on the people is favourable, or not unfavourable, to the next step which it is necessary for them to take in order to raise themselves to a higher level.

Ib p. 14¹³⁶

The desire of vengeance which takes possession of the heart of savages resembles the instinctive fury [rage] of an animal rather than the passion of a man; it turns with undiscerning fury against inanimate objects. If struck with an arrow in battle they will tear it from the wound break it and bite it with their teeth and dash it on the ground

Robertson America I 351-2

Q[quote]d in D.Stewart VI 199.¹³⁷

The Alps themselves which your own poets used to love so reverently you look upon as soaped poles in a bear garden, which you set yourselves to climb and slide down again with shrinks of delight.

Ruskin. King's Treasuries¹³⁸

¹³⁴. The passage is taken from a 17th Century German text, translated into English in 1862: 'Gotthold's Emblems', *Sunday Reader*, 1.

¹³⁵. Mill, *Representative Government*, chap. X, p. 80.

¹³⁶. Mill, *Representative Government*, chap. II, p. 14.

¹³⁷. Robertson W., *History of America*, quoted by Stewart, *Active and Moral Powers of the Mind*, in *Works*, vol. VI, p. 199.

You have made railroads of the aisles of the cathedrals of the earth, and eat off their altars

Ib¹³⁹

That vulgar excitement which looked upon the granite of the Alps as an unoccupied advertisement wall for chalking names upon.

Ib¹⁴⁰

Buckle II 475-6¹⁴¹

A philosopher should aim solely at truth and should refuse to estimate the practical tendencies of his speculations. If they are true let them stand, if they are false, let them fall. But whether they are agreeable or disagreeable, whether they are consolatory or disheartening whether they are safe or mischievous is a question not for philosophers but for practical men. Every new truth which has ever been propounded has for a time caused mischief; it has produced discomfort, and often unhappiness, sometimes by disturbing social or religious arrangements and sometimes merely by the disruption of old and cherished associations of thought. It is only after a certain interval and when the framework of affairs has adjusted itself to the new truth that its good effects preponderate, and the preponderance continues to increase until at length the truth causes nothing but good. [But, at the outset, there is always harm.] And if the truth is very great, as well as very new, the harm is serious: Men are made uneasy, they flinch; they cannot bear the sudden light; a general restlessness supervenes; the face of society is disturbed, or perhaps convulsed; old interests and old beliefs have been destroyed before new ones have been created: ... It is the business of practical men to moderate these [such] symptoms and to take care that the truths which philosophers discover are not applied so rashly as to dislocate the fabric instead of strengthening it. But the philosopher has only to discover the truth, and to promulgate it; and that is hard enough work for any man, let his ability be what [as great as] it may. This division of labour between thinkers and actors secures an economy of force and prevents either class from wasting its power. It establishes a difference between science which ascertains principles and art which applies them. ... The

¹³⁸. Ruskin J., *Sesame and Lilies*, London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1865; first lecture, 'Of Kings' Treasuries'.

¹³⁹. Free quotation from Ruskin, ib.

¹⁴⁰. Ruskin, Preface to the first edition of *Sesame and Lilies*.

¹⁴¹. Buckle H. T., *History of Civilization in England*, pp. 474-6.

duty of a philosopher is clear. ... He must take every pains to ascertain the truth; and having arrived at a conclusion, he instead of shrinking from it because it is unpalatable or because it seems dangerous, should, on that very account, cling the closer to it, should uphold it in bad repute more zealously than he would have done in good repute; should noise it abroad far and wide utterly regardless [of] what opinions he shocks or what opinions [interests] he imperils; should on its behalf court hostility and despise contempt; being well assured that, if it is not true, it will die; but that if it is true, it must produce ultimate benefit, albeit unsuited for practical adoption by the age or country in which it is first propounded.

Buckle II 475-6

(His) *Concessis*, punctum esse quod nullam magnitudinem habeat: extremitatem et quasi libramentum in qua nulla omnino crassitudo est: lineamentum longitudinem latitudine carentem [liniamentum sine ulla latitudine]

Cicero Acad[emicos] II 36¹⁴²

It is indeed the common fate of human reason in speculation to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as possible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is solid or no[t]. Arrived at this point all sort of excuses are sought after in order to console us for its want of stability or rather indeed to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous an investigation.

Kant Cr.[itique of P.[ure] R.[eason] p. 6 Bohn¹⁴³

If the inferior animals have no cognisance of themselves (and there is ~~no~~ good reason to believe that they have none, although ~~here~~ no opinion is here offered on the point) in that case, with all their senses they are mere incarnate absurdities gazing upon unredeemed contradiction

*Βλέποντες έβλεπον μάτην
κλύοντες ουκ ήκουον.*

Ferrier Inst[itutes] 271-2¹⁴⁴

¹⁴². Cicero, *Contra Academicos*, II, 36.

¹⁴³. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, London, Bohn's Philosophical Library, 1860, p. 6.

¹⁴⁴. Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysic*, pp. 271-2. The Greek quotation is from Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, 447-8: 'Eyes they had and saw not; And ears they had but heard not'.

Whether organisation alone could produce life and thought[,] we probably shall never certainly know[,] unless we could repeat Frankenstein's experiment; but that our mental operations have material conditions[,] can be denied by no one who acknowledges what all now admit, that the mind employs the brain as its material organ

Mill Dissert[at]ions] & Disc[ussions] III 109¹⁴⁵

Laughter is incident most to them who are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great minds one of the proper works is to help and free others from scorn and compare themselves with the notable

Hobbes Lev[iathan] ch 6¹⁴⁶

Courage, verbal acuteness, command over the forms of argumentation and a popular style will make out of the shallowest man[,] with a sufficient lack of reverence a considerable negative philosopher. Such men have never been wanting in periods of culture[;] and the period in which Bentham formed his early impressions was emphatically their reign, in proportion to its barrenness in the more noble products of the human mind.

Mill Dissert[at]ions] & Disc[ussions] I 334¹⁴⁷

Of good there be three kinds; good in the promise i.e. pulchrum; good in effect as the end desired which is called jucundum, delightful [, and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable]; and as many of evil.

Hobbes Lev[iathan] ch. 6¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵. Mill J.S., 'Bain's psychology' in *Dissertations and Discussions*, 3 volumes, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1867; vol. III, 109. Marshall owned three copies of the book. The one kept in the Marshall Library is annotated.

¹⁴⁶. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 27.

¹⁴⁷. Mill J.S., 'Bentham' in *Dissertations and Discussions*, vol. I, p. 334.

¹⁴⁸. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 24.

I return to my interrupted speculation of bodies natural; wherein (if God give me health to finish it) I hope the novelty will as much please, as in the doctrine of the artificial body it is used to offend. For such truth, as opposeth no man profit a pleasure is welcome to all

Hobbes Lev[iathan] The last sentence¹⁴⁹

Luther stood not alone: no really great man ever stood alone. The secret of their greatness lies in their understanding the spirit of the age in which they live, and in giving expression with the full power of faith and conviction to the thoughts of millions.

Max Müller Preface to German Classics p. 25¹⁵⁰

Professorial knight errantry still waits for its Cervantes. Nowhere have the objects of learning been so completely sacrificed to the means of learning; nowhere has that Dulcinea - knowledge for its own sake - with her dark veil and her barren heart, numbered so many admirers, nowhere have so many windmills been fought and so many real enemies left unhurt as in Germany, particularly during the last two centuries.

ib p. 28¹⁵¹

Buckle II 502¹⁵²

There is, in poetry, a divine prophetic power, and an insight into the turn and aspect of things, which, if properly used, would make it the ally of science instead of the enemy. By the poet, nature is contemplated on the side of the emotions; by the man of science, on the side of the understanding. But the emotions are as much a part of us as the understanding; they are as truthful; they are as likely to be right. Though their view is different, it is not capricious. They obey fixed laws; they follow an orderly and uniform course; they run in sequences; they have their logic and method of inference. Poetry, therefore, is a part of philosophy, simply because the emotions are a part of the mind. ... The magnificent generalizations¹⁵³ of Newton and Harvey could never have been completed in an age absorbed in one unvarying round of experiments and observations. We are in that predicament, that our facts have outstripped our

¹⁴⁹. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 396.

¹⁵⁰. F. Max Müller, *The German Classics from the Fourth to the Nineteenth Century: a German Reading-book*, London, Longman & Co., 1858, preface p. XXV.

¹⁵¹. Müller, *German Classics*, preface p. XXVIII.

¹⁵². Buckle, vol. II, p. 502.

¹⁵³. Marshall's text has 'speculations'.

knowledge, and are now encumbering its march. ... We want ideas, and we get more facts. We hear constantly of what nature is doing, but we rarely hear of what man is thinking. ... I can hardly doubt that one of the reasons why we, in England, made such wonderful discoveries during the seventeenth century, was because that century was also the great age of English poetry. ... Shakespeare and the poets sowed the seed, which Newton and the philosophers reaped. Discarding the old scholastic and theological pursuits, they drew attention to nature, and thus became the real founders of all natural science. They did even more than this. They first impregnated the mind of England with bold and lofty conceptions. They taught the men of their generation to crave after the unseen. They taught them to pine for the ideal, and to rise above the visible world of sense. ... Since the seventeenth century, we have had no poet of the highest order, though Shelley, had he lived, would perhaps have become one. He had something of that burning passion, that sacred fire, which kindles the soul, as though it came fresh from the altar of the gods. ... The noble English poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is read more than ever, but it does not colour our thoughts; it does not shape our understandings, as it shaped the understandings of our forefathers. Between us and them is a chasm which we cannot entirely bridge. We are so far removed from the associations amid which those poems were composed, that they do not flash upon us with that reality and distinctness of aim, which they would have done, had we lived when they were written. Their garb is strange, and belongs to another time. Not merely their dialect and their dress, but their very complexion and their inmost sentiments, tell of bygone days, of which we have no firm hold. There is, no doubt, a certain ornamental culture, which the most highly educated persons receive from the literature of the past, and by which they sometimes refine their taste, and sometimes enlarge their ideas. But the real culture of a great people, that which supplies each generation with its principal strength, consists of what he learnt from the generation immediately preceding.

The antimaterialists seem to me to strengthen and encourage their adversaries by such arguments as this: "But then you leave the Soul nothing to do - you make it a sort of idle presence by which everything is said to be done, a sort of royal personage in whose name all is done. But then all being done through the brain and body, these are really what *do* all, and the supposition of the present *soul* is merely otiose." But all this seems to me to be a mistake, and just the kind of mistake which gives possibility [of reason] to the materialist supposition.

The body does not do one sort of work and the soul another, so as that if we find the body doing all that we previously supposed the soul did, we have lost all reason for supposing the soul to exist. If the “soul” and “body” are the terms which we like to use, then the body is the instrument of the soul and it certainly is to a *great* extent an instrument of thought and knowledge. ... The supposition of the professed materialist is, that thought [it] is sufficiently described, as thought, by being called a modification of the more refined portions of the body.

Grote What is Materialism in Macmillan¹⁵⁴

The great art of genius is never to say too much and to avoid with equal anxiety a commonplace manner and matter that is not commonplace. Whenever he deviates into any originality of thought he takes care that it shall be such as excites surprise for its acuteness, rather than admiration for its profundity. He takes care [to] say rather that nature took care for him ... I believe that I could do all that Junius has done and surpass him by doing many things which he has not done, for example by an occasional induction of startling facts in the manner of Tom Paine and lively illustrations and witty applications of good stories and appropriate anecdotes in the manner of Horne Tooke. I believe I could do it if it were in my nature to aim at this sort of excellence, or to be enamoured of the favour and immediate influence which would be its consequence and reward. But it is not in my nature. I not only love truth, but I have a passion for the legitimate investigation of truth. The love of truth, conjoined with a keen delight in a strict [and skilful] yet impassioned argumentation, is my master passion, and to it are subordinate even my love of liberty and all my public feelings; and to it whatever I labour under of vanity, ambition, and all my inward impulses.

Coleridge Lit[erary] Remains vol. I, p. 248&¹⁵⁵

<i>Germany</i>	Genius	Talent	Fancy
<i>England</i>	Genius	Sense	Humour
<i>France</i>	Cleverness	Talent	Wit

¹⁵⁴. Grote, J., ‘What is Materialism’, *Macmillan’s Magazine*, 15, March 1867, p. 374. Already transcribed in Raffaelli 1994, pp. 65-66.

¹⁵⁵. *The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. by H.N. Coleridge, William Pickering 1836, 2 volumes, vol. I, pp. 248-9.

I define *genius* as originality in intellectual construction: the moral accompaniment and actuating principle of which consists, perhaps, in the carrying out [on] of the freshness and feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood.

By *talent* on the other hand I mean the comparative facility of acquiring, arranging and applying the stock furnished by others, and already existing in books or other conservatories of the intellect.

By *cleverness* I mean a comparative readiness in the invention and use of means for the realising of objects and ideas.

... In literature cleverness is more frequently accompanied by wit; genius and sense by humour

<i>Germany</i>	Idea or Law anticipated	Totality	Distinctness
<i>England</i>	Law discovered	Selection	Clearness
<i>France</i>	Theory invented	Particularity	Palpability?

<i>Germany</i>	<i>England</i> ¹⁵⁶	<i>France</i>
Cosmopolitism	Contemptuous nationality	Ostentatious and boastful nationality
Craving of sympathy	Inward pride	Vanity
Enthusiasm and visionariness	Zeal, Zealotry	Fanaticism
The Past and the Future	The Past and the Present	The Present

Coleridge, the Friend Section II Ess.[ay] I. p. 282¹⁵⁷

genius is but a continued attention

Helvetius

genius is only a protracted patience

Buffon

¹⁵⁶. Later corrected into 'Englishman' and 'Frenchman'.

¹⁵⁷. Coleridge S., *The Friend. A Series of Essays to Aid the Formation of Fixed Principles in Politics, Morals and Religion*, London, Bell & Daldy, 1867; section II 'On the grounds of morals and religion', essay one, postscript, p. 280-282.

In the exact sciences at least it is the patience of a sound intellect when invincible which truly constitutes genius

Cuvier

The force of applying [an] attention, steady and undissipated, to a single object is the sure mark of a superior genius

Chesterfield

The above quoted in Ham[ilton] Lect[ures] I 258¹⁵⁸

Ruskin says of great artists “imagine all that any of these men have seen or heard in the whole course of their lives, laid up accurately in their memories as in vast storehouses, extending with poets even to the slightest intonations of syllables heard in the beginning of their lives and with painters down to minutes folds of drapery and shapes of leaves and stones, and over all this unindexed and unmeasurable mass of treasure, the imagination brooding and wandering but dream gifted, so as to summon at any moment exactly such a group of ideas as shall justly fit each other.” This is the explanation of their genius as far as it can be explained.

Lewes, Princ.[iples] of S.[uccess] in L.[iterature] F[ortnightly] I 587¹⁵⁹

Arnot. Laws from Heaven for Life on Earth¹⁶⁰

p. 15 Proverbs compared to concentrated essences used by travellers

‘The proverb may not present to the eye the appearance of the wisdom which it was originally made of, but a great quantity of the raw material has been used up in making one and that one, when skilfully dissolved, will spread out to its original dimensions¹⁶¹

p. 41

The unconverted (having other work before them) have no time to be there (in the theatre)

¹⁵⁸. Quotations from Helvetius (*De l'Esprit*, discours iii, ch. iv), Buffon (quoted by Ponelle, *Manuel*, p. 371), Cuvier (*Eloge Historique de M. Haiiy*) and Chesterfield (*Letters to his son*, letter lxxxix) are given by Hamilton, *Lectures*, I, p. 258.

¹⁵⁹. Lewes G. H., “The Principles of Success in Literature: Of Vision in Art”, *Fortnightly Review*, 1, July 1865.

¹⁶⁰. Arnot W., *Laws from Heaven for Life on Earth. Illustrations of the Book of Proverbs*, London, Nelson & sons, 1857-58. The following quotations and page numbers are from this work.

¹⁶¹. ‘Like those concentrated essences of food, which are so much used by travellers in our day, the proverb may not present to the eye ...’.

The converted (having other joys within them) have no inclination.¹⁶²

p. 139

It is not uniform experience that a man lives long in proportion as he lives well. Wickedness shortens life but God's government is moral: it is not a lump of mere materialism. He will have men choose goodness for His sake and its own, therefore a slight veil is cast over its present profitability

p. 348 &

A man responsible for his belief, on same principles as in Butler's *Analogy*.¹⁶³

Die Nützlichkeit oder Fruchtlosigkeit (eines guten Willes) kam diesem Werthe weder etwas zu setzen noch abnehmen. Sie wurde glichsam nur die Einfassung sein um ihn in gemeinen Verkehr besser handhaben zu können, oder die Aufmerksamkeit derer, die noch nicht genug kenner sind, auf sich zu ziehen, nicht aber um ihn kennern zu empfehlen und seinen Werth zu bestimmen

Kant Grundlegung zur Met.[aphysik] der Sitt.[en] Erst.[er] Absch.[nitt]¹⁶⁴

*Bridges France under Richelieu and Colbert*¹⁶⁵

Works written on the principle of exclusive nationality, useful as they may be as collections of material, have to the student of the science of history something of the kind of provincial or parochial records. Western Europe used to be regarded as a whole[,] united in medieval times by a common religious faith, united no less in modern times by a uniform system of industrial activity, of scientific study and aesthetic culture. [9-10]

¹⁶². 'We have sometimes thought the matter of attending the theatre, and similar scenes of midnight merriment, might be profitably put in the form of a dilemma, thus: - The unconverted (having other work before them) have no time to be there. The converted (having other joys within them) have no inclination'.

¹⁶³. The reference to Butler is not in Arnot's book. Butler J.S.H., *The Analogy of Religion*, part II, chapter 6.

¹⁶⁴. The usefulness or fruitlessness [of a good will] can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value. Kant, I. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Leipzig, Modes und Baumann, 1838, p. 11.

¹⁶⁵. Bridges, *France under Richelieu and Colbert*. Edinburgh, Edmonston & Douglas, 1866. The following quotations and page numbers are from this work.

p. 12& Not only were the free burghers the rivals of feudal power, but by the mode in which they obtained their freedom they decomposed and modernized that power. Of the two elements of which feudal power consisted, aristocracy and monarchy, they allied themselves with one to inevitable ruin sooner or later of the other ... In England they united with the aristocracy against the Kings; in France with royalty against aristocracy. [...]

In England the monarchical element of feudalism was exceptionally strong; then too there was a quasi feudal element, that of the Saxon gentry, who, sharing the oppression of their countrymen in the towns, shared their resistance and were ultimately joined by the great barons. Hence the peculiar character of the English constitution, aristocratic rather than monarchic, provincial rather than metropolitan, localized not centralized.

43. Stern, inflexible, massive, (he elsewhere calls his features Dantesque) far reaching, profound, pitiless, Richelieu could hardly have felt much personal sympathy for the wily supple, adroit, fair spoken man (Mazarin) to whom he entrusted his power.

59. The legists of France had from the time of St. Louis always supported the monarchic element of feudalism against the aristocratic. Guided by the tradition of the Roman Empire they felt that in the strength of the central power lay the surest guarantee that the forces of the nation should be concentrated to public and national purposes. [...] Richelieu found them strenuous supporters and indeed without them would have been powerless.

63. To Elizabeth and Cromwell; to Henry IV, Sully and Richelieu war and foreign conquest were no longer the primary occupation of rulers. War, when they engaged in it, was a necessary evil accepted only for the sake of peace. ... During the first 11 years after the death of Mazarin Colbert was supreme. Under his guidance the whole energy of the state was concentrated as it had never been before on a pacific development of its commerce industry and intellect. These are years which have given such lustre to the reign of Louis, the only years that can claim honourable mention in his history. During the remaining 43 years of Louis reign retrograde influences became gradually supreme. The influence of Louis eclipsing that of Colbert plunged France into a long series of aggressive wars; the Edict of

Nantes was revoked; the Jesuits worked their will and for the least 30 years of Louis life they turned France into a second Spain.

Poetry Dialogue [74-76]

A (to B who has been upholding the Modern School of Poetry against the Classic, and in modern times Browning against Tennyson, with all the uncompromisingness of youth): Perhaps you would not mind giving us your idea of what is essential for the highest kind of poetry.

B: Do you want an oration, or would you prefer a logically accurate description arranged under heads and chapters?

A: As you please, but begin somewhere. You say its subject must be man, directly or indirectly.

B: Undoubtedly, and man in the full power of his weakness, in the full glory of his humiliation, in the full triumph of his failures, in the full peace of the struggles, in the full life of his death.

{C (a boy): Yes, but I always thought that conundrums and charades were the best poetry in the *Lady's and Gentleman Diary*.}

B (without looking round continues): If a poet claims for himself the place of man's highest instructor, he must paint man emphatically as man, not as the angels, who [are] above, nor as the beasts, who are below a state of perpetual gearing and striving, but man as he lives in the strong energy of becoming - Goethe's "werden", like a bird beating its wings against the cage that confines it, with its eyes ever fixed on the measureless blue beyond.

A: Then you would have him exhibit the inner and the outer life of individual men, their thoughts and their actions.

B: He may do so, but this is not essential to the highest kind of poetry, nor even desirable. He should do it only as far as he finds it necessary in order to relieve for himself the burden of writing, or for others that of reading.

A: Then his field of operations is limited in extent, and if he will do much, he must mine deeply.

B: Yes. Deeply but not too deeply. He must not be ever running down vague and disconnected shafts ever too deep, nobody knows where. He must make up his mind to go to

a certain level and to work that level, to make galleries in it, and cross-galleries, so that people can, if they choose, make it into a comfortable house. He must have plenty of connexions with the stories above, and in short give every possible aid to those who would see the mine well. But he must not bother himself to go below this floor. That he must leave for others to do, who may come after him. In a word he must be, after his fashion, dogmatic.

A: I should not have expected you to make that restriction.

B: I dare say not. But I am so much afraid of his becoming vague and hesitating. The poet's trumpet must give no uncertain sound.

A: Now, we are getting on to the subject of his style. I thought you were not very particular about that.

B: Nor am I. He may write in prose or in verse, whichever he likes best. And I do not even care about each individual sentence being intelligible at the first time of reading it, or even at the first time of reading the poem. But I do care about his having something to say which is perfectly definite and intelligible. He must know what he means himself, and then anyone else, who chooses to take the trouble, can find out what he means. If he is really in earnest, he may be difficult, but he cannot be obscure; he may be cumbrous, but he must be vigorous.

A: Then you neglect altogether what are called graces of style.

B: Yes. That is, I would not have a poet hampered by them. In so far as they are obtrusive, they are simply odious. But in so far as they are natural, and therefore true, they not only add to the pleasure of his readers, but, by increasing his attractiveness, increase also his power.

And, mind you, among graces of style I do not count metaphors and illustrations. These belong to the very essence of poetry, whose special duty is to give clear and strong impressions. There is no means whatever by which this can be done so fully and forcibly as by powerful illustrations. There are also of course what are called beautiful illustrations which belong to the "graces of style" and are included in the judgment passed on them.

A: In fact you subordinate everything to the subject matter and to the purpose; but these two things are not quite the same. In the subject matter, if not vagueness, yet at least some gearing after fuller knowledge may be tolerated.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶. At the end of this unfinished manuscript there is the following sentence, evidently added later: 'Intended to lead up to the acknowledgment of Kant as a thorough and great poet'.

Appendix

Books of philosophical interest which belonged to the young Alfred Marshall and were given to Cambridge Libraries

Books in the Marshall Library (formerly the Departmental Library of Economics)

- Buckle, H.T. *History of Civilization in England*, vol. I – III, London 1867 (New Edition)
Flint, R. *The Philosophy of History*, vol. I only, Edinburgh and London, 1874
Grote, J. *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*, edited by John Bickersteth Mayor, Cambridge 1870
Hume, D. *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1793
Kant, I. *The Metaphysics of Ethics*, Edinburgh, 1869
Lecky, W.E.H. *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, 2 vols., London 1869
Mill, J.S. *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, London 1865
Mill, J.S. *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 2nd ed., London 1865
Mill, J.S. *Considerations on Representative Government*, London, 1865
Mill, J.S. *Three Essays on Religion*, London, 1874
Mill, J.S. *Dissertations and Discussions, Political, Philosophical, and Historical*, reprinted chiefly from the Edinburgh and Westminster Reviews, vol. I-IV, London, 1859-1875
Spencer, H. *Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative*, vol. I-III, London 1868-1874
Spencer, H. *First Principles*, 2nd ed., London, 1867
Spencer, H., *The Principles of Biology*, 2 vols, London, 1865 and 1867
Stewart, D. *Collected Works*, ed. by W. Hamilton, vol. VI, Edinburgh 1859.

Books in the Cambridge University Library and catalogue number:

- Berkeley, G. *The Querist*, Glasgow, 1751, Marshall.d.29
Condillac, E. B. de *Le commerce et le gouvernement*, Amsterdam 1776, Marshall.d.50
Hobbes, T. *Leviathan*, London 1651, Marshall.b.1
Mill, J. S. *A System of Logic*, 4th edn, 2 vols London 1856 Marshall.c.46-47
Mill, J. S. *A System of Logic*, 6th edn 2 vls, London 1865 Marshall.c.59-60
Mill, J. S. *A System of Logic*, 7th 2 vls, edn, London 1868 Marshall.c.69-70
Mill, J. S. *Dissertations and Discussions*, 3 vols London 1859-1867 Marshall.c.50-52
Mill, J. S. *Dissertations and Discussions*, 3rd edn, 3 vls, London 1867 Marshall.c.63-65
Mill, J. S. *Utilitarianism*, London 1864 Marshall.c.55 (1)
Mill, J. S. *Considerations on Representative Government*, London 1865 Marshall.c.55 (2)
Mill, J. S. *Auguste Comte and Positivism* 2nd edn, London 1866 Marshall.c.55 (3)
Mill, J. S. *On Liberty* London 1859 Marshall.d.60
Mill, J. S. *An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, 2nd edn London 1865 Marshall.c.56
Mill, J. S. *An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, 3rd edn, London 1867 Marshall.c.61

[Stewart, M.] *Memoir of the Late Dugald Stewart*, Edinburgh 1838 Marshall.c.41

Books given to the Moral Sciences Board in October 1905. Full transcript of the document in Marshall's handwriting:

'Berkeley's *Works* 5 vols, ed. Fraser; Locke's *Works* 10 vols (Note the first three vols. *Essay on the Understanding* are interleaved, because I expected to lecture on it at least every other year for ever more!!); Stewart's *Active and Moral Powers of Man* (2 vols); Lewes's *Life & Mind* 3rd edition, 2 vols; also his *History of Philosophy* 2 vols; Vol. I of *Mind*; Boole's *Laws of Thought*; Venn's *Empirical Logic*; Bentham's *Works* vol. I being lost. [There are about ten or eleven others, I think, double columns. ed. Bowring]; Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*; a good many of Herbert Spencer's *Works*; Spinoza's *Works* ed. Willis; Whewell's *Elements of Morality*; Green *Prolegomena to Ethics*.' (Cambridge University Archive, Moral Science Board Minutes, Min.V.10, 25 October 1906, loosely quoted by Groenewegen 1995, p. 336)